The confluence of ideas and interests

This week, we were assigned to look at international incidents and examine whether ideas or interests prevailed in foreign policy decisions. Yet, in most of the presentations (including my own) there was no clear demarcation of ideas and interests. In almost every foreign policy decision, the two were simply intertwined.

For my presentation, I examined the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961. While financial interests played a large stake, the anti-Communist ideology of the time was without a doubt a primary motivation. The need to fight communism was an idealistic one, yet national security in this regard would represent a main interest. The two simply cannot be treated as completely separate goals in this regard.

For this reason, I really enjoyed the Laffey and Weldes article this week and how they treat ideas as symbolic technologies. While I enjoyed the Keohane article as well, I disagree that ideas and interests can be completely separated and analyzed as separate entities. Ideas, as the underpin of our thoughts and behavior, shape our interests in ways that we don't even realize. Professor Jackson illustrates this well in his lecture with his suit metaphor. Our day-to-day decisions aren't necessarily conscious thoughts, but a combination of everything in our environment that we've ever experienced. Our lives and experiences are shaped by the ideas that we have been exposed to, and thus, help mold our interests.

I sought to understand the confluence of ideas and interests while working on my presentation this week. I wanted to understand what had ushered in the "Red Scare" in 1950s-60s United States, aside from the obvious political reasons. What caused the mass hysteria that persecuted US citizens and created a climate of fear? This panic squashed free speech, civil liberties, and marked a large shift to the right in America, a shift that still exists today. Clearly, ideas are quite powerful, but does a difference in them signal a threat? The madness of the Red Scare would signify that even ideas are enough to cause a national security panic, which then becomes a very real material interest. Ideas and interests cannot be separated in policy decisions, as they are two sides of the same coin.

Ideas of Self Preservation

So, the big debate was whether or not ideas matter in the face of interests.  The general consensus being that when it comes to a case of “me” or “you” our natural instinct is to choose “me.” However, there is evidence that after World War II a new belief system was put into place to temper rationale with a firm belief of how far man’s inhumanity to man can go.  But, is it really a case of values?

It is debatable whether or not this is a value system of being a society of decent human beings or is this rational calculation for self preservation.  From a historical front, people were so appalled at the heavy losses sustained after WWII that they created the UN, World Bank and other organizations to make sure that economic and social issues in other countries never got so far out of hand again. If you look at the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the United Nations intervened between two of the permanent five to avoid a nuclear war that would have devastated millions.

Now, the international community is joined in a collective effort to detour North Korea’s nuclear program.  UN sanctions have not deterred the hermit kingdom’s efforts to become a nuclear power and have acted as a unifying force for rival countries (i.e. Russia and the U.S.) under a belief/fear of what would happen should N. Korea develop nuclear weaponry equal to the larger powers.

At the very least, maybe, we can say that outrage and a belief system from the heavy losses of the last World War gave large powers impetus to enact these safeguards.  However, interests of self preservation are seen to branch out.

The Persian Pattern?

Another week has passed and the class (SISG-760) continues to discuss how states makes decisions. Do they take action with ideas in mind, or their interests? In my last post I posted a presentation analyzing how Iran considered interests and ideas in their willingness to negotiate with the P5+1 the details of their nuclear program. 

After watching classmate's presentation on the British Royal Navy personnel detained by Iran in 2007, and having a discussion with another classmate about the latest incident where Iran help captive ten sailors from the U.S. Navy who had strayed into Iranian waters, a pattern seems to have emerged regarding the behavior from Iran. 

Although the details of the two incidents were somewhat different (one group of sailors was seized in disputed water; another group had clearly entered Iranian waters), they were both succeeded by a strikingly similar series of reactive events by Iran. On both occasions, Iran seized the intrusive naval vessels and reacted sharply about the breach of sovereign waters. Iran then demanded an apology by the respective governments of the captive sailors. (Both actions driven by the ideas of Iran --a proud country with a rich culture and influential history.) As the incidents progressed --with not apology coming to Iran-- the Iranian regime begins an apparent shift to consider the interests of Iran and ultimately releases the sailors. 

This same pattern can be seen on several other occasions involving Iran. (Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979, to name another.) Is this pattern Iran's "signature sequence of events?" Are other "signature" sequences unique to other states? Leave your comments below! 

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More Thoughts on Ideas and Interests

Following Week 3's live session, I had a few more thoughts regarding the question of "interests or ideas." In the Goldstein and Keohane chapter, they argue that while ideas may not be the main motivational force in the decision-making by states, they do have a role in actions that states take. I agree with this position but would suggest that ideas play a role only when those ideas align with the interests of a state. 

Throughout the various discussions that took place during the live session and breakout session, I kept coming back to this idea. It seems that when a state can choose to promote their beliefs at the cost of their best interests that the state will choose to promote their best interests. 

I also followed --and elaborated on-- this same thought in this week's Module 2 Interactive Activity assignment. (The presentation can be seen below.)

Leave you thoughts in the comments section below. 

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Ideas vs. Interests, Part 2

In class this week, we had a great discussion on how ideas and interests influence foreign policy. This week’s readings were also quite illuminating on the effect of ideas in foreign policy decisions, and how states reconcile their interests with their beliefs. What really drives foreign policy – interests or ideas?

            Goldstein and Keohane suggest that states rely on ideas to legitimize their interests.¹

However, ideas and beliefs themselves have proven to be powerful motivators in and of themselves. According to the Heidelberg Institute of Conflict Research, the primary cause of conflict is ideological change². Wars have been fought for centuries over differences in religion, and more recently over differences in political and economic ideology. Ideas, and the propagation of them, have always been strong enough motivators for centuries to drive foreign policy and conflict.

However, interests are often cloaked as ideas when it comes to foreign policy decisions. Ideas such as “promoting democracy” are often used as justifications for conflicts and invasions when a material interest is actually behind these decisions. Why are certain countries given help in humanitarian crises, while others are ignored? Why are nations willing to overlook human rights violations in some countries, but not others? A vested interest is often behind foreign policy decisions even when cloaked as an idea.

Case in point – the Rwandan genocide. Why did the United Nations and the United States decide not to intervene in the 1994 mass murder? In subsequent years, critics have condemned the US and the UN for their lack of action, but why did they not act in in the first place? Is it because neither the US or the UN had any vested interest in sub-Saharan Africa? While the UN security council did eventually provide assistance, it was too little, too late. Interests, rather than ideas, prevailed in this instance. Can ideas be promoted when there is more strategic values in simply promoting interests?

¹ Goldstein, J., & Keohane, R. O. (1993). Ideas and foreign policy: Beliefs, institutions, and political change, pg.4 Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

² Heidelberg Institute for Conflict Research, infographic available from http://www.economist.com/node/12758508

The readings explore what drives states and policies and, during class, we discussed how to tell the difference between ideas and interests.  The overall conclusion that we seemed to come to is that policies start out as ideas and interests branch out from these ideas.  Later, as time and circumstance change, ideas turn around and shape/distort ideas.  This is really evident in the ongoing back and forth with the U.S. and Russia.  During the Cold War, idea drove policies on both sides and the Red Scare in America was based on the “belief” that there were people who were not the definition of a true “American.” Vice versa, in the Soviet Union, the government outlawed literature and clothes from the West, because, they did not coincide with the idea (beliefs) of Communism.  The polarity of the two was a worldwide show of vetoes in the Security Council, where they used their veto power quite often and stunted UN efforts in major international affairs.

               Synthesizing “interests and ideas” with “coercion and rational bargaining” add up to a case of realism.  From an idealistic perspective, states seem to want to work together, in cooperation, but, at the end of the day a state (or sovereign) will look out for the preservation of its people and its sovereignty.  Right and wrong (values) become dictated by what serves the interests of the people.

Interests vs. Ideas

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani (left) and former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (right).

Module 2 readings (and PTJ's "soliloquy") focus on the issues of interests versus ideas. Do states act with interests in mind or ideas? As usual, when I read and listen to almost any topic in international studies, I think of Iran (my most-favorite area of interest and favorite state/culture to learn about). 


Two Iranian leaders came to mind when thinking about acting on interests and ideas; one leader represents acting for the interests or Iran and the other represents acting on the ideas --or beliefs-- of Iran. 

The first leader is current Iranian President Hassan Rouhani. To me he represents an Iran that acts on the interests of Iran. He has helped to usher in a diplomatic thaw between the United States and Iran and, as of this past week, and Iran free of crippling international sanctions that had been placed on it as a result of their secretive nuclear enrichment program. These actions, it seems, have been taken out of the interests of the Islamic State of Iran. 

The other leader that comes to mind is Rouhani's predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad, one could argue, took actions to protect the ideas of Iran, rather than the interests of Iran. Under the U.N. Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that Iran is party to, Iran has a right to peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Under Ahmadinejad presidency, Iran took steps to enrich uranium for what they claimed to be peaceful purposes. Ahmadinejad was acting on the ideas or Iran to do so. Building underground enrichment facilities is a slippery slope toward sanctions, but Ahmadinejad believed that Iran --a sovereign state party to the NPT-- had the right to do so. 

This leads me to my last thought for this post, and draws from PTJ's Module 2 lecture. How do we know what what the true interests are of any state? And how do we really know what a state's ideas or beliefs are? I would argue (as would Dr. Jackson, I assume) that Iran's ideas as a whole could be pretty accurately summarized. We could study their history, culture, political actions, etc. and come up with a good idea of what their beliefs are. But what are their true interests? Might Iran have entered into the latest nuclear deal (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) for some other reason that is also in their interests? Maybe it serves to promote their ideas, also. Might it serve the ideas of Iran to be regarded once again as a major player in the international community while questions simultaneously arise regarding Saudi Arabia's place in the international community. (Another here) While abandoning hopes of obtaining a nuclear arsenal might be a blow to the ideas of Iran, becoming the moderate voice of Islam and and the center of power in the Middle East would, undoubtedly, promote the ideas --and ultimately the interests-- of Iran. 

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Ideas vs. Interests, Part 1

In this week's readings, we are looking at what influences state policy and behavior - ideas or interests? Our readings indicate that ideas are quite the powerful motivator in influencing behavior, as ideas are the backbone for many institutions - our legal system and capitalism, just to name a few.


I found the Weber reading to be interesting, but quite difficult to get through due to his cultural imperialism and racism. His constant reiteration that every culture that isn't "Western" is somehow lacking is offensive and incorrect. He repeatedly cites ideas and invention from non-Western regions that became incorporated into Western ideas, yet fails to realize that these things wouldn't be possible without non-Western innovation. Further, I disagree that only Western ideas result in a "successful" state. States have the right to define success on their own terms, and I find it presumptuous and rude of Weber to champion the Western line of thinking as the only correct one.


However, I did agree with his idea that free labor creates a solid middle class, which is essential for economic growth. If Weber were alive today, it would be interesting to see his thoughts on China - a Communist government with a capitalist economy with the fastest-growing and largest middle class in the world. China is a non-Western, non-Protestant, non-"capitalist" (in the strictest sense of the word) country. It would be interesting to see how these ideas would be reconciled.

What the readings are telling me is there is a constant struggle between “interest” and “idea” and it is, sometimes difficult to tell where one ends and the other begins.  In the article regarding foreign policy, it may look like states are acting rational, in order to achieve their own interests, however they might be guided by ideas.  The best that I could understand from this is the idea of America’s isolationist tendencies. 

After World War II, the U.S. realized that it could not just sit on the sidelines of a changing international world so, it began to get involved in the new international remake of the globe.  Even though America is more involved, the country’s leaders still fall on isolationist policy as a means to keep somewhat separate from the rest of the world.  Take the ICC as an example.  Clinton helped create the Rome Statute as a guide for the Court and placed America’s conditional signature on the treaty as a gesture of good faith that with a little work the U.S. could be part of this organization.  Then, when Bush came into office he officially rescinded the U.S.’s signature and then implemented laws that penalized allies that did sign the Statute. 

From a behavioral standpoint it looks like pure interest and it may very well be.  However, like the lecture stated, it can be both rational and values based.  The value is that Americans do not trust overseas forces to govern what goes on in its own borders, which is most likely a residual effect of going through this problem with the British monarch.  This idea is further compounded by the U.S. deep seeded mistrust of a central government. 

What is rational may just be the tip of the iceberg, the small chunk that is visibly floating on the surface.  The idea that guides it is the biggest unseen part that no others may bother to pay attention to and that tends to be a source conflict in international relations.

Another example would be the reading about using Protestant ethics as a means to control the deadly sin of greed that Weber describes as “pursuit of profit.” Capitalism is rooted in tradition and convention and is, therefore, an idea.  This idea is meant to keep the rational calculations of chasing profit in check.

The message about idea and interest is understandable, but still murky.  The way the two work together reminds me of Hobbes’ Machiavellian philosophy on sovereign states and how rational calculation is rooted in values which explains why the ends justifies the means. 

Module1 - Coercion or Reason?

Satellite image of the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) in Iran. (2009)

 Over the past two weeks, the class (American University's SISG-760 -- International Studies: History, Theory, Practice) has --among other things-- been reading about and analyzing different international organizations and how they harness the power of coercion and reason (rational bargaining) to usher progress in the international community. 

Group 4 (this group) studied the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the United Nation's high court. In short, our group found that the ICJ is somewhat the U.N.'s arm of reason, or it's arm of rational bargaining. States only go to the ICJ when they both agree to have their dispute heard by the court. And, as the United States demonstrated, the court's decision really isn't enforceable unless the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) becomes involved and issues a resolution requiring states to follow some course of action. (The short video our group made explaining --and highlighting some of the more notable cases of-- the ICJ can be seen below.)

The question of "coercion or reason" is a really fascinating topic. As somewhat of a subscriber to realist theory and that almost every action a state takes is done in an effort to maximize its power, I submit the question of "when is state really bargaining?" Do states come the bargaining table perhaps with ulterior motives? We have to look no further than today's news of the American prisoners being released from custody in the Islamic Republic of Iran to find an action with questionable motives. Has Iran freed these prisoners as an expression of good will to the U.S. or is it another strategic move from a shrewd player of diplomacy? (I have thought for some time about this approach to IR theory: realism by way or liberalism, or that states try to maximize power through cooperation.) Perhaps only time will reveal the true answer to why Iran has recently become so cooperative with the West (was is reasoning or were the coercive effects of the international sanctions finally too strong?) but certainly the ideas of coercion and reasoning are relevant and essential to understanding the many dynamics constantly at play in international relations. 

What do you think? Why has Iran become so cooperative? Have they turned over a new leaf, or are they waiting patiently to maximize power? Leave your questions/comments below! 

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Uranium enrichment centrifuge cascade

These last two weeks, we have been analyzing Hobbe’s work Leviathan in order to come to some understanding of how power structures are formed, why we form them, and what keeps them running (or tears them down).  The answers, according to Hobbes, boils down to two main concepts: coercion and rational bargaining.  To me, his views seemed to be a little too contradictory and I could not help but wonder what sovereign power (leviathan) would I (or anyone else) could possibly trust to maintain security and look after the people they have a “Covenant” to protect, if all humans are as horrible and opportunistic as Hobbes seems to describe.  Overall, though, I think he is on to something, when you apply his theory of bargaining and coercion into today’s international arena.

The United Nations plays both sides.  You have institutions like the International Court of Justice and the World Bank that rely heavily on rational bargaining and then, there is the Security Council which acts as the organization’s coercive force.  Anytime bargaining either does not get the job done or it infringes on the sovereignty or interests of an SC member, the council uses its coercion power to have the final say in how things will end in the matter. What I gathered from Hobbes and real life examples are that rational bargaining does not work without coercion to give it legitimacy and coercion needs rational bargaining to keep a “Leviathan’s” actions from looking like tyranny. 

That is not to say that it always works that way.  One of the biggest complaints against the Security Council is the blatant use of position by the members of P5 to further their own interests, as seen in the cases of the U.S. v. Nicaragua and U.S. v Libya.  America used its SC position to avoid adhering to the ICJ’s verdict and then the country but then placed sanctions on another country to get them to comply with the verdict.  This brings me back to Hobbe’s earlier comments on human nature and the idea of self-preservation, especially, when it concerns sovereignty.  If people are so bad and things are destined to crumble, then what is the point of even trying to form a society?

In class, we discussed what drove Hobbes in his theories of sovereign powers and why these “Leviathans” are necessary.  Looking through the scope of history, the reason for his way of thinking began to make more sense.  He had a job where he was surrounded by the rich and royal and he seemed to be conditioned in their absolute “right” to exist to protect people.  One person mentioned that this book was Hobbes thinking back to before the civil war in England (the good old days), when there was order and people adhered to a clear set of rules.  You can really see his respect for the monarch in his Machiavellian defense of the use of a sovereign’s coercive force for the good the people from their own inherent selfishness.  Which (again) begs the question, how do you avoid anarchy with a selfish government?

In my opinion, nations will do what is necessary to protect its people, ideals and sovereignty.  Nicaragua and Libya were both large issues, but when looking at grand scheme, possible World War III type of situations, big powers will set their interests aside for the good of all.  World War II showed the world what the worst of humanity is capable of and I think that has pushed us, for reasons of self-preservation, to institute safeguards against any selfishness that Hobbes thinks is too ingrained in our “Self” to overcome.

Winning the "War of All Against All"

In our study of the Leviathan these past two weeks, we’ve examined several factors that go into governing and protecting the ideal state, and how well these factors work on a global scale. The ideal form of government, the nature of man, and therefore states, and the struggle between coercion and reason are all ideas that both Hobbes and we as a class have analyzed and applied to the real world.

However, much of our study left us with more questions than answers. Primarily, the interaction between rational bargaining and raw coercion made us think about whether these ideas can really be reconciled. In our group project, we looked at the International Court of Justice and how they use rational bargaining to solve disputes between states. However, when the dispute is between an extremely powerful state and a weaker state, we found that there are really no controls to enforce rational bargaining and that powerful states can and do use raw coercion to promote their interests at almost any cost. After all, who will stop them? Powerful states with strong militaries are respected and feared, though perhaps not agreed with, in international politics, and even smaller states with strong militaries and nuclear weapons are greatly feared as well, and diplomatic relations with them must be handled delicately.

            Another Hobbesian ideal that left our class in discussion was his promotion of a monarchy. While Hobbes posits the sovereign as an absolute monarch, we disagreed that this was an ideal form of government. Hobbes spends much of the Leviathan describing “the nature of man” and has few positive things to say. It stands that the sovereign is a human, or a group of humans, possessing this nature as well, thus, does it make sense to give them absolute power? It is worth noting that in the time period in which Hobbes wrote the Leviathan, there was an English civil war and a fractured monarchy, and perhaps the only vision of a stable government Hobbes could imagine was a solid monarchy. In order to promote peace, citizens must feel that they have a stable government with their ideas and interests at heart. While Hobbes offers several arguments on why democracy is not ideal, absolute monarchy is far from ideal as well. Hobbes does indicate that the sovereign should be chosen by the people (in a brief mention), however, he offers little guidance on this process.

            It is perhaps worth noting that as a class full of (mostly) Americans, at American University, that deep, deep down, the idea of monarchy feels extremely wrong. We have been raised to believe in a political system that not only encourages, but necessitates, our input and control over who leads us and makes our big decisions. Our system of checks and balances directs our political system in a way as such that what Hobbes describes can never happen. This doesn’t mean we don’t want to be led – far from it. We just want our part in shaping the head of the Leviathan. While our democratic system is not perfect, the contentment that people feel over their say in the political system is far beyond anything in Hobbes’ lifetime, and it would be interesting to see how the Leviathan would be formed today.